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Defending Israelis or Suppressing Palestinian
Self-Determination? An Analysis of Operation
Protective Edge Using the Two-Factor Test
Wajiha Rais

*

On July 7, 2014, Israel launched its third military offensive in Gaza in
six years, dubbed Operation Protective Edge.1 The Operation lasted for fifty
days before Israel and Hamas agreed to an Egyptian brokered cease-fire on
August 26, 2014.2 According to the United Nations, 2,131 Palestinians were
killed during the offensive, of whom 1,473 were civilians.3 On the Israeli
side, seventy-one people died, of whom four were civilians.4
Israel justified the offensive as an act of self-defense against
indiscriminate rocket attacks5 and the so-called “terror tunnels.”6 The
“terror tunnels” were a network of underground tunnels that went from
Gaza to Israeli territory.7 In an interview with Fox News, Israeli Prime
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, reiterated that “Israel . . . is defending its
people as any country would under similar circumstances.”8 On its official
blog, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that a goal of Operation
Protective Edge is to “stop Hamas’ incessant rocket attacks against Israel’s
*
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1
Rocket Attacks on Israel from Gaza, IDF BLOG, www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/rocket-attackstoward-israel (last visited Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Rocket Attacks on Israel from Gaza].
2
William Booth & Ruth Eglash, Israel, Hamas Reach Cease-Fire Deal Brokered by Egypt,
WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-hamas-reach-ceasefire-deal-brokered-by-egypt/2014/08/26/cc834c02-2d49-11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html.
3
Gaza Emergency Situation Report (as of 4 September 2014, 08:00 hrs), UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 1
(Sept. 4, 2014), www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sitrep_04_09_2014.pdf.
4
Id. at 2.
5
Netanyahu: Some in West Say They Support Israel’s Right to Defend Itself as Long as We
“Don’t Exercise That Right”, CBS DC (July 22, 2014), washington.cbslocal.com/2014/07/22/
netanyahu-some-in-west-say-they-support-israels-right-to-defend-itself-as-long-as-we-dont-exercisethat-right [hereinafter CBS DC].
6
The IDF’s Mission in Gaza: Destroy Hamas Terror Tunnels, IDF BLOG (July 17, 2014),
www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/17/idf-begins-ground-operation-gaza.
7
These tunnels, built by Hamas, reach up to thirty meters below the ground. In 2006, the tunnels
were used to capture Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit. Timeline 1,940 Days from Gilad Shalit’s Abduction to
His Release, HAARETZ (Oct. 11, 2011), www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/timeline-1-940days-from-gilad-shalit-s-abduction-to-his-release-1.389452.
8
CBS DC, supra note 5.
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civilians”9 while Netanyahu said that the Operation will continue until the
tunnels are destroyed.10 The message behind the statements is clear—Israel
is defending itself against Palestinian rockets and tunnels. United States
President, Barack Obama, echoed this message when throughout the
Operation, he reaffirmed Israel’s “right to defend itself.”11
Not everyone agrees with the characterization of Israel’s actions as
self-defense. During the Operation, John Dugard wrote an op-ed titled,
“Debunking Israel’s Self-Defense Argument,” in which he argued that
Israel’s offensive “must [not] be seen as an act of self-defense by a state
subjected to acts of aggression by a foreign state or non-state actor. Instead,
it should be seen as the action of an occupying power aimed at maintaining
its occupation.”12 He reiterated this argument the following week in an
interview with Amy Goodman on an episode of DEMOCRACY NOW!13 The
Russell Tribunal on Palestine14 similarly found that “people living under
colonial rule or foreign occupation are entitled to resist occupation” and that
“Israel’s actions are those of an occupying power using force to maintain its
occupation and to suppress resistance, rather than a state resorting to force
in lawful self-defense.”15
How Israel’s actions are characterized carries legal significance. The
use of force in self-defense is an “inherent right” of States under Article 51

9

Rocket Attacks on Israel from Gaza, supra note 1.
Steve K. Walz, Netanyahu: Gaza Operation Will Continue Until Terror Tunnels Are
Neutralized, JEWISH PRESS (July 30, 2014), www.jewishpress.com/special-features/israel-at-waroperation-protective-edge/netanyahu-gaza-operation-will-continue-until-terror-tunnels-are-neutralized/
2014/07/30.
11
See Joseph Lederman, Obama: “Israel Has the Right to Defend Itself”, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 14, 2014, 8:18 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/15/obama-israel-ceasefire_n_
5586229.html; Obama: Israel Has Right to Defend Itself, PRESS TV (July 27, 2014, 10:32 PM),
www.presstv.com/detail/2014/07/27/373040/obama-israel-has-right-to-defend-itself.
12
John Dugard, Debunking Israel’s Self-Defense Argument, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (July 31,
2014, 6:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/gaza-israel-internationalpoliticsunicc.
html.
13
Can Israel Claim Self-Defense Against the Territory It Occupies? Int’l Jurist John Dugard
Says No, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 6, 2014), www.democracynow.org/2014/8/6/can_israel_claim_self_
defense_against.
14
“The Russell Tribunal has no legal status but acts as a court of the people, a Tribunal of
conscience, faced with injustices and violations of international law, that are not dealt with by existing
international jurisdictions, or that are recognised but continue with complete impunity due to the lack of
political will of the international community. . . . [The Tribunal] is composed of eminent people from all
states . . . . [Its legitimacy] does not come from a government or any political party but from the
prestige, professional interests and commitment to fundamental rights of the Members that constitute
[the] Tribunal.” About, RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON PALESTINE, www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/
about-rtop (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
15
Russell Tribunal on Palestine Emergency Session on Gaza 30, RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON
PALESTINE (Sept. 24, 2014), www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/TRPConcl.-Gaza-EN.pdf.
10

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 131 Side B
04/28/2016 10:11:02

C M
Y K

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 132 Side A

04/28/2016 10:11:02

14 - RAIS_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Analysis of Operation Protective Edge

4/15/16 8:21 PM

257

C M
Y K

04/28/2016 10:11:02

16
The other exception is the use of force by authorization of the U.N. Security Council under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
17
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 141 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall opinion].
18
HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 135–36 (1988).
19
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
Commentaries, [2001] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [hereinafter Draft Articles
on Responsibility of States].
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of the U.N. Charter and one of only two exceptions to the Charter’s ban on
the use of force under Article 2(4).16 Furthermore, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) confirmed that Israel has both the right and a duty to protect its
inhabitants.17 The use of force for the purpose of suppressing a people’s
struggle for self-determination, on the other hand, is prohibited under
international law.18 While the former purpose behind the use of force is
legal, the latter is illegal. The question, which follows, is how does one
determine whether force was employed for the legitimate purpose of
protecting citizens or for the illegal purpose of suppressing a people’s
struggle for self-determination? Neither the State of Israel nor Dugard
explain how they arrived at their respective characterizations of Operation
Protective Edge. In fact, existing international law does not provide us with
any test, guideline, or legal framework to make this difficult determination.
The law, as it currently exists, is inapt at dealing with the interplay of force
and self-determination as it takes place in the Israel-Palestine conflict. This
Comment proposes a two-factor test to fill this gap in the law.
This Comment is divided into seven sections. The first provides a brief
background of the law on self-determination, including the right to use
force by national liberation movements and occupying powers. The
following three sections demonstrate the inaptness of existing law, in the
context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, to provide an answer to the question
of when force by an occupying power is for the legitimate purpose of
protecting its inhabitants and when it is for the illegitimate purpose of
suppressing self-determination. The second section argues that jus in bello,
or international humanitarian law (IHL), is unsuited to answer the question
at issue because it only regulates how war is conducted and is unconcerned
with the reasons for the use of force. This section further argues that
occupation law, in general, is wholly unsuited to the Palestinian situation
because it was created to regulate European occupations, which unlike
Palestine did not involve liberation struggles. The third section explains that
in light of the ICJ’s Wall advisory opinion, the law of self-defense too is
unsuited to the Israel-Palestine situation. The fourth section concludes that
the doctrine of necessity, codified in the Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts,19 does not help either since it presumes a
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wrongful act, which leads us back to the question of whether the use of
force was in fact wrong (i.e., whether it was used to suppress selfdetermination). To answer the question at issue, the fifth section proposes
the following two-factor test: (1) was force necessary to combat the threat
to the occupier’s inhabitants; and (2) did force go beyond that which was
necessary to combat the threat? The sixth section applies this test to the
threat of tunnels in Operation Protective Edge in order to determine whether
Israel used force in pursuit of a legitimate security operation or if its aim
was to suppress the Palestinians’ struggle for self-determination. The
seventh section concludes with a summary of the argument.
SECTION I: SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE BY
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND OCCUPYING POWERS
The Right to Self-Determination

20

C M
Y K
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A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973).
Id. at 25-6; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (2d
ed. 2006) (“Self-determination as a legal right or principle threatened to bring about significant changes
in the political geography of the world, not limited to the dismemberment of Empires. . . . [I]t was
potentially a most significant exception to the traditional view that the creation of States is a matter of
fact and not of law.”).
22
SUREDA, supra note 20, at 20.
23
Id. at 27.
24
Id.; CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 122, 127.
25
CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 122.
26
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 88, 118.
27
League of Nations Covenant.
21
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The concept of national self-determination has its historical roots in
the concept of popular sovereignty proclaimed by the French Revolution.20
Self-determination, at the time of the French Revolution, meant selfgovernment; a government should reflect the will of the demos. Because
self-determination posed a threat to the established order, for a long time it
was considered a political issue and was not accorded a legal status.21
However, the concept made a popular return after the First World War.22
The pressures of decolonization accelerated the acceptance of selfdetermination as a legal right.23 Today, it is “difficult to deny the right of
self-determination a true legal status.”24 Although it had contentious
beginnings, the principle of self-determination is now “firmly established in
international law.”25 The ICJ, in its 2004 advisory opinion, reaffirmed the
principle of self-determination and reiterated its status as a right erga
omnes—meaning it is a concern of all States.26
Interestingly, no explicit mention of self-determination appears in the
Covenant of the League of Nations.27 The concept was only “indirectly
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recognized as applicable to the territories placed under mandate.”28 These
were territories which, after the First World War, were no longer under the
sovereignty of States that previously governed them and its people were not
yet considered capable of self-government.29
The U.N. Charter, on the other hand, does include the word, “selfdetermination,” in Article 1(2) and in the preamble of Article 55.30 The
Charter states that the purpose of the United Nations (U.N.) is “[t]o develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace.”31 The International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also reaffirm the right of
all peoples to self-determination.32
Despite the official recognition of the right to self-determination in the
U.N. Charter, it was unclear for some time who the subjects of selfdetermination were.33 In other words, exactly who or which “peoples” had
the right to self-determination? Sir Ivor Jennings eloquently stated the
following:
Nearly forty years ago a Professor of Political Science who was also
President of the United States, President Wilson, enunciated a doctrine
which was ridiculous, but which was widely accepted as a sensible
proposition, the doctrine of self-determination. On the surface it
seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous
because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who the
people are.34

28

SUREDA, supra note 20, at 96 (quotations omitted); 2 DAVID HUNTER MILLER, THE DRAFTING

OF THE COVENANT 12–13 (1928).
29
League of Nations Covenant
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art. 22; SUREDA, supra note 20, at 97.
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2, & art. 55.
31
U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
32
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360, art. 1 (1967); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368, art. 1 (1967).
33
SUREDA, supra note 20, at 28; see CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 125.
34
SIR IVOR W. JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 55–56 (1956).
35
SUREDA, supra note 20, at 99.
36
Id. at 99–100.
30
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Debates in the Coordination Committee during the drafting of the U.N.
Charter reveal problems relating to the meaning of the word “peoples.”35
There were disagreements among States on the use of the word “peoples”
and what this meant vis-à-vis the terms “nation” and “state.”36 In response
to the confusion, the Secretariat clarified in a memorandum that “peoples”
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refers to “group of human beings who may, or may not, comprise states or
nations.”37 Self-determination covers a group of peoples, nations, and
States.38 Thus, the U.N. Charter not only recognized a peoples’ right to selfdetermination, but it also gave the word “peoples” the broadest possible
meaning.39
With regard to the Palestinians, specifically, the ICJ noted in its
advisory opinion in 2004 that Palestinians are indeed “peoples” with a right
to self-determination.40 In fact, it stated, “[T]he existence of a ‘Palestinian
people’ is no longer in issue.”41 The Court elaborated that the existence of a
Palestinian people has been recognized even by Israel, whether in the
exchange of letters between Yasser Arafat42 and Yitzhak Rabin43 or in the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip.44
The Use of Force by National Liberation Movements

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
47
48
49
50

04/28/2016 10:11:02

46

Id. at 100.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 118.
Id.
Former President of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
Former Prime Minister of Israel.
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 118.
HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94.
Id. at 135–36.
See id. at 91, 95.
Id.
Id. at 93–94.
See HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94.
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Interestingly, however, while a people have a right to selfdetermination, it does not automatically follow that they may use force in
pursuit thereof.45 Despite the universal recognition and acceptance of a
peoples’ right to self-determination, consensus is lacking on whether force
can be used in pursuit of that right.46
Historically, the right to use force was not extended to national
liberation movements.47 This is because, traditionally, the right was
understood to belong only to States and not to “peoples.”48 However, as
more and more colonies started to gain independence following the Second
World War, the notion that national liberation movements have a right to
use force in pursuit of self-determination began to gain support.49 The
rationale behind the shift was that “[i]f the continuance of colonial
domination is contrary to the right of self-determination . . . then the use of
force to secure that right should not be condemned.”50
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Id. at 136.
Id.
53
Id. at 96.
54
Id.
55
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960); CHRISTINE GRAY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 60 (3d ed. 2008).
56
GRAY, supra note 55; HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94.
57
G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2105 (Dec. 20, 1965); HEATHER WILSON, supra note
18, at 95.
58
G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2105 (Dec. 20, 1965) (emphasis added).
59
HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94; see GRAY, supra note 55.
60
GRAY, supra note 55.
61
G.A. Res. 2708 (XXV), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2708 (Dec. 14, 1970); G.A. Res. 2652, ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2652 (Dec. 3, 1970); G.A. Res. 3295 (XXIX), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3295 (Dec. 13,
1974); GRAY, supra note 55, at 62.
52
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Support for the right of liberation movements to use force in pursuit of
self-determination seems to be divided along political lines.51 The right “is
actively supported by the newly independent States and the Eastern Bloc
States, but has never been accepted by an established government
confronting a liberation movement, or by the Western States.”52 The
division and associated politics are pronounced in the several United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions passed on the subject.
During the 1960s, an era of wide decolonization, the UNGA passed several
resolutions recognizing the legitimacy of liberation movements’ struggle to
achieve self-determination.53 Due to disagreements between States,
however, the resolutions avoided unequivocal language expressly
condoning the right to use force as part of the struggle, so as to achieve a
wide consensus among States.54
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, passed in 1960, was the first major resolution on
decolonization.55 While it recognized the right of colonial people to struggle
for independence, the resolution made no mention of an armed struggle.56
Then in 1965, the UNGA passed Resolution 2105 (XX) in response to
Portuguese, South African and Rhodesian intransigence.57 The Resolution
“recognize[d] the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial
rule to exercise their right to self-determination.”58 While many States
interpreted “struggle” to mean armed struggle, the colonial powers and the
U.S. resisted this interpretation.59 This ambiguous word formed the standard
language in subsequent resolutions on the subject throughout the 1960s.60
Some UNGA resolutions on Portuguese colonies and Namibia
affirmed the legitimacy of the people to struggle for independence “by all
means at their disposal.”61 While a step forward, the resolutions once again
fell short of unequivocally condoning the right to use force. The ambiguity
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was deliberate so consensus among States could be achieved.62
In 1970, the UNGA passed by acclamation the Declaration on
Principles of International Law, according to which,
every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present
principle of their right to self-determination. . . . In their actions
against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise
of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek
and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles
of the Charter.63

62
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Y K
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GRAY, supra note 55, at 62.
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); HEATHER WILSON, supra
note 18, at 98.
64
HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 99.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
GRAY, supra note 55, at 62.
68
HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 96; S.C. Res. 232, ¶ 4 (Dec. 16, 1966).
69
HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 96; see, e.g., G.A. Res. 3070 (XXVIII), at 78 (Nov. 30,
1973); G.A. Res. 39/72 (Dec. 13, 1984).
70
HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94–95.
63
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Some took the above language, which was arguably stronger than that of
previous UNGA resolutions, as confirmation of the right to use force by
liberation movements.64 Others like Heather Wilson, however, argue that
the language continues to be ambiguous and the resolution was passed
unanimously precisely because “its more controversial provisions could be
interpreted in a variety of ways.”65 Despite the ambiguity, however, the
debates on the resolutions reveal that most States understood the language
to allow for armed struggle.66
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) too passed several
resolutions using the same ambiguous terms.67 In 1966, for example, the
UNSC passed a resolution recognizing the legitimacy of the “struggle” of
the people of Southern Rhodesia.68 Just like the language in the UNGA
resolutions, it was unclear whether “struggle” meant armed or simply
peaceful struggle.
Conversely, resolutions that expressly recognized the right to use force
were met with resistance from colonial powers and other Western States.69
Meanwhile, developing countries were adopting resolutions in international
conferences explicitly recognizing the legitimacy of the right to use force in
pursuit of self-determination.70 The ambiguous language of UNGA and
UNSC resolutions, combined with significant support from Afro-Asian
countries, but a lack of support from colonial and Western powers for
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stronger language, reveals an obvious divide based on political and power
interests.
Even if some States did not explicitly accept the authority of liberation
movements to use force as a matter of law, their actions indicated
acquiescence in some circumstances.71 Although some States did not openly
condone the use of force by liberation movements, “they had at least begun
to condemn the use of force by the colonial power, but not the liberation
movement.”72 For example, since the 1967 war in which Israel occupied
territories belonging to its neighbors (and at least until 1973), there was a
trend in UNSC resolutions to condemn Israeli use of force against “terrorist
activities” coming from Jordan and Lebanon but to not similarly condemn
Arab guerilla activity as illegal.73
The fact that the Security Council has never expressly condemned the
guerilla activities of the Palestinians [emanating from Jordan and
Lebanon] can be interpreted as an implied recognition of their right to
recover at least the territories from which they were displaced in the
June 1967 hostilities, and to do so by the use of force.74

The Use of Force by an Occupying Power
While the law is unclear on whether national liberation movements
may use force in pursuit of their right to self-determination, it is very clear
in prohibiting an occupying power from using force to suppress the
71
73
74
75
76
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Y K

Id. at 103.
Id. at 111.
SUREDA, supra note 20, at 343.
Id. at 343–44.
HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 136.
CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 135–36.

04/28/2016 10:11:02
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In summary, a consensus is lacking on the right of liberation
movements to use force for self-determination with colonial powers and
other Western States generally opposing such a right while the developing
world supporting it. Nevertheless, “the trend . . . since 1960 in particular
has been toward the extension of the authority to use force to national
liberation movements.”75 Meanwhile, according to James Crawford—judge
at the ICJ—a non-State entity’s right to use force for self-determination is
“legally neutral” in the sense that it is “not regulated by international law at
all.”76 Therefore, while it cannot unequivocally be said that Palestinians
have the right to use force against Israel in their struggle for selfdetermination, nor can it unequivocally be said that they do not have such a
right. While the law lacks a clear allowance for the use force by
Palestinians, it also lacks a clear prohibition against their use of force.
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Id. at 135–37, 147.
HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 135.
79
Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and Answers, ICRC (Aug. 4,
2008), www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm.
80
GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1st ed. 1910).
81
Id.
82
Tristan Ferraro (ed.), Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory,
ICRC (Mar. 2012), www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4094.pdf; Hague Regulations,
art. 43.
83
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 141.
84
Id. ¶¶ 88, 118.
85
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, at art. 26 comm. (5).
86
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 141.
78
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people’s struggle for self-determination.77 “[T]he use of force to deny the
free exercise of a people’s right to self-determination is contrary to the
principles of international law.”78 All occupations or administrations of
territory by foreign powers are supposed to be temporary. Even though
international law recognizes the state of occupation, such a state has always
been understood as a temporary condition. A belligerent occupier is
obligated to withdraw from occupied territories upon the cessation of
hostilities.79 Because belligerent occupation is a consequence of war, “it is
not political in its effects.”80 Therefore, sovereignty is not transferred to the
occupying power.81 Prolonged belligerent occupations in effect become
annexations, in violation of international law.
An occupying power is not prohibited from using force under all
circumstances. Rather, because an occupying power has the obligation to
ensure public order and safety, it may use police force to that end.82 An
occupier also “has the right, and indeed the duty to respond, in order to
protect the life of its citizens.”83 Therefore, an occupying power may use
force for certain purposes, but must never use force to suppress a people’s
struggle for self-determination. In fact, because self-determination is a right
erga omnes,84 and has the status of a pre-emptory norm,85 all States are
prohibited from suppressing this right whether by forceful or non-forceful
means.
In summary, unlike the ambiguous nature of the law on the right of
national liberation movements to use force, the law very clearly prohibits an
occupying power from employing force to suppress self-determination.
Meanwhile, an occupying power can use force for certain other purposes
including protecting its population from attacks.86 Hence, while Israel may
use force to protect its civilians from Palestinian attacks, it cannot use force
to suppress the Palestinians’ struggle for self-determination. The question
that follows is, how does one know whether Israel is using force to protect
its civilians or to suppress Palestinian self-determination? The following
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three sections explore existing bodies of law (i.e., jus in bello or occupation
law, law of self-defense and the doctrine of necessity) in search of an
answer to this question. Because existing law does not provide any relevant
guidance, Section V of the Comment proposes some factors to help answer
the question.
SECTION II: JUS IN BELLO AND THE LAW OF OCCUPATION
This section looks at the jus in bello legal regime and the law of
occupation. It explores the two in search of guidance to help answer the
question that is at issue in this Comment. This section finds that the jus in
bello legal regime offers no relevant guidance since it only governs how
force is used once an armed conflict begins, and is unconcerned with the
motives behind the use of force. The central question of this Comment,
however, is concerned with only the motives of the State of Israel behind its
use of force, and whether those motives are the protection of its civilians or
the suppression of Palestinian self-determination. This section also finds
that the law of occupation, in general, is inapt at dealing with the question
at hand because occupation law developed outside the context of colonial
occupations.87 It was historically meant only to regulate European
occupations, which were not colonial occupations, and, therefore,
occupation law does not take into account issues of self-determination.88
Jus in Bello
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87
Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation: Critical Examinations of the
Historical Development of the Law of Occupation, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 51, 72 (2012)
[hereinafter Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation].
88
Id.
89
KEIICHIRO OKIMOTO, THE DISTINCTION AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUS AD BELLUM AND
JUS IN BELLO 8 (2011).
90
Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, ICRC RESOURCE CTR.,
(Oct. 31, 1997), www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnuu.htm.
91
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 101.
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Jus in bello is the legal regime which regulates the conduct of war.89 It
is also referred to as international humanitarian law (IHL), the bulk of
which is codified in The Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva
Convention, and Additional Protocols I and II. The treaties, which form the
core of IHL, are considered customary international law. This means that
the treaties are binding on States even if they are not a party to them. The
jus in bello legal regime is triggered once an armed conflict begins. 90 The
ICJ confirmed in its 2004 advisory opinion that international humanitarian
law is applicable to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.91
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92

Id.
OKIMOTO, supra note 89, at 14–24; Francois Bugnion, Just Wars, Wars of Aggression and
International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 523, 533–36 (2002).
94
OKIMOTO, supra note 89, at 11.
95
Id. at 15.
96
Bugnion, supra note 93, at 541.
97
OKIMOTO, supra note 89, at 29.
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While the jus in bello legal regime is applicable to the Occupied
Palestinian Territory,92 it is irrelevant to the question at issue in this
Comment because jus in bello is not a legal basis for the legitimate use of
force. It merely regulates how war is waged and is unconcerned with the
reasons for waging war, let alone whether those reasons are legitimate or
illegitimate. Such concerns fall under the domain of jus ad bellum instead.
In fact, jus in bello rules of warfare apply to all parties to the conflict
regardless of the legitimacy of their use of force or their status as victim or
aggressor.93 In other words, just because a State waged an illegal war
against another State, this does not mean that the victim State is not bound
by jus in bello in its use of force against the aggressor State. The underlying
interest, which jus in bello seeks to safeguard, is the protection of
civilians.94 The equal applicability of jus in bello to both victim and
aggressor ensures that civilians of the aggressor State are protected just like
civilians of the victim State.95
Additionally, all parties to an armed conflict are bound to respect jus in
bello rules of war regardless of the legality of their initial resort to force.
This helps ensure that the aggressor State cannot flout its jus in bello
obligations just because its initial resort to force was unlawful. If all
military actions of a State, who unlawfully resorted to force, were
considered illegal by virtue of the illegality of its initial resort to force, then
the aggressor State would lack any incentive to restrict its military conduct
according to IHL.
It is impossible to demand that an adversary respect the laws and
customs of war while at the same time declaring that every one of its acts
will be treated as a war crime because of the mere fact that the act was
carried out in the context of a war of aggression.96
The otherwise lawful method of warfare by an aggressor State does not
become unlawful merely because it violated jus ad bellum.97
Jus in bello is unconcerned with the reasons for using force but only
with regulating conduct of hostilities once an armed conflict has begun. It
is, therefore, irrelevant to the question whether an occupying power used
force to protect its civilians or to suppress self-determination. The
occupying power can abide by IHL but still employ force for the
illegitimate purpose of suppressing a people’s struggle for self-

93
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determination. Its compliance (or non-compliance) with IHL says nothing
about its motives for resorting to force. At most, it may be argued that a
gross violation of jus in bello principles of military necessity and
proportionality may indicate a motive that is other than the protection of
civilians. Generally, however, jus in bello is irrelevant for purposes of the
question that this Comment poses.
The Law of Occupation
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98
See generally YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2009) [hereinafter ARAI-TAKASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION].
99
HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 20; see also Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 78, 118
(finding that Palestinian territory east of the Green line is occupied by Israel and that Palestinians are a
“people” who have the right to self-determination).
100 Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 72; Martti Koskenniemi,
Occupied Zone—”A Zone of Reasonableness”?, 41 ISR. L REV. 13, 30 (2008).
101
See Matthew Saul, Research Fellow at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights and Lecturer
at Durham University, U.K., Symposium on the Functional Approach to the Occupation of the Gaza
Strip and the Right to Self-Determination (Apr. 25, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/25/the-func
tional-approach-to-the-occupation-of-the-gaza-strip-and-the-right-to-self-determination (stating, “both
Hague Law and Geneva Law were created before the emergence of the legal right to selfdetermination”)
102
Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 55.
103
Id.
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One would assume that the most obvious law to consult for limits on
the use of force by an occupying power is the law of occupation.98
However, even the law of occupation, in general, is not applicable to the
central question of this Comment as it relates to the Israel-Palestine
conflict. This is because the Israel-Palestine conflict is a “situation . . . in
which belligerent occupation and wars of national liberation overlap.”99 The
law of occupation, on the other hand, was created to regulate European
occupations, which unlike the occupation of Palestine, did not involve
liberation struggles.100 Because existing occupation law developed outside
the context of colonial occupations involving liberation struggles, it does
not take into account the right of self-determination.101 It is, therefore, inapt
to deal with issues of force in the context of self-determination, which do
exist in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Ideas of liberalism and freedom from monarchical rule laid the
foundation for the development of the law of occupation.102 Such ideas
swept across Western Europe from the end of the eighteenth century to the
middle of the nineteenth century, challenging the monarchical political
order of the continent.103 Revolutionaries waged wars in other countries in
order to oust the ruling monarchy and liberate the oppressed local
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87, at 55.

Id.
Koskenniemi, supra note 100, at 30.
Id.
Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87; Koskenniemi, supra note 100.
EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 25 (2d ed. 2012).
FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF 1791; Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note

110

Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 55.
Koskenniemi, supra note 100, at 26.
112
Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 199 (2005).
113
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 43,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
114 BENVENISTI, supra note 108, at 69.
115 Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 74.
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population.104 Since the revolutionaries waged war not to annex territory but
to liberate the local population, the revolutionaries’ interests were aligned
with those of the locals.105 Thus, the occupying revolutionaries did not face
resistance from the occupied population and there was no tension between
the two.106 Occupation was meant to be temporary and, therefore, did not
lead to liberation struggles. The law of occupation developed in this context
as a way of managing the new European territorial order.107
After the French Revolution, occupation became distinct from
conquest.108 In fact, the 1791 French Constitution stated, “[T]he French
nation renounces the undertaking of any war with a view of making
conquests, and it will never use its forces against the liberty of any
people.”109 Territory was no longer seen as belonging to the king, but rather
as belonging to the people.110 Thus, ousting of the sovereign did not transfer
sovereignty to the occupying power.111 This new conceptualization of
sovereignty forms the basis of the “conservationist principle”112 in the
Fourth Geneva Convention whereby the occupying power is simply a
custodian of the occupied territory who must preserve the status quo and
does not have the sovereign authority to change existing laws.113 The
occupying power merely fills a “temporary vacuum created by the ousting
of the local government and maintain[s] its bases of power until the
conditions for the latter’s return are mutually agreed upon.”114 Thus,
occupation law developed, as a theory distinct from conquest, to manage
the newly emerging European political and territorial order.
It is not as if European powers at the time were not engaged in
occupations for the purpose of annexing territory in which they faced
resistance from liberation movements. In fact, the period of the collapse of
the European monarchical political order was also the height of imperialism
and colonialism.115 However, these “occupations [of non-European
territories] that led to colonial control were placed outside the constraints of

111
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Id. at 53.
Id. at 74.
118
Saul, supra note 101.
119
Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 72.
120
See HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 20.
121
ARAI-TAKASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 98, at 44; UNITED STATES DEP’T OF
THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE: FIELD MANUAL 27–10, ¶ 432 (1956).
122
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 113, art. 68.
123
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION ¶ 80 (2009).
124
Saul, supra note 101.
125 Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87.
117
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the law of occupation.”116 Since sovereignty was a “gift of civilization,” the
law of occupation, which preserved the sovereignty of the occupied people,
was applied only to “civilized” European nations and not to “uncivilized”
non-European nations.117 Hence, the law of occupation was never
developed to deal with colonial occupations involving liberation
movements. In fact, the legal right of self-determination emerged after the
creation of occupation law.118 In fact, until the period of decolonization in
the mid-twentieth century, the law of occupation was considered a largely
European project.119 It is, therefore, unsuited to the Israeli occupation of
Palestinian Territory, which is both a belligerent occupation and a struggle
for national liberation.120
The Law of Occupation, for example, permits the occupying power to
require the occupied people to swear an oath of obedience (albeit not
allegiance) whereby the occupied must behave in a peaceful manner, not
take part in hostilities and obey the occupying power.121 Furthermore,
occupied inhabitants who sabotage military institutions of the occupying
power may be punished by death.122 The foundation of belligerent
occupation, writes Yoram Dinstein, is the “power of the bayonet.”123 This
stands in stark contrast to the law of self-determination, which bans the use
of force to suppress a people’s struggle for self-determination. The contrast,
which is due to the fact that the law of occupation developed separately
from and before the legal right to self-determination124 shows that
occupation law is ill-suited to colonial occupations involving national
liberation struggles.125 Its rules on the use of force cannot be appropriately
applied to the Israeli occupation of Palestine as they were never meant to
regulate such an occupation. We, therefore, cannot look towards the law of
occupation for an answer to the question, when use of force by an
occupying power is for the illegitimate purpose of suppressing selfdetermination.
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SECTION III: THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
If not the law of occupation, perhaps the law of self-defense can help
shed some light on the issue of when force used by an occupying power is
legitimate and when it is for the illegitimate purpose of suppressing selfdetermination. The law of self-defense seems to be the obvious legal regime
to consult given that self-defense is the justification that Israel presents for
Operation Protective Edge—not surprisingly since other than U.N. Security
Council authorization, it is the only legally valid reason for States to use
force. This section finds, however, that the law of self-defense is
inapplicable to the Israel-Palestine conflict because Article 51 traditionally
does not encompass armed attacks by non-state actors, Security Council
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 only refer to international terrorism, and the
self-defense argument causes an impermissible confusion between the jus
ad bellum and the jus in bello. It, therefore, cannot be relied upon to answer
the question that is at issue in this comment.
The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion on the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory provides valuable insight into the applicability (or
lack thereof) of the law of self-defense to Israeli measures taken in response
to terror attacks emanating from Palestinian territory.126 The Court
addressed the following question in its opinion:

Even though the construction of the wall was a non-forceful measure
as opposed to the forceful measures used in Gaza, the opinion is still
relevant to Operation Protective Edge. If the law of self-defense is
inapplicable to Israel’s non-forceful responses to terror attacks, then it is
certainly inapplicable to its forceful measures.
Israel justified its construction of the wall, which as planned
incorporated about sixteen percent of the West Bank between the wall and
the Green Line,128 as an act of self-defense against terror attacks emanating

127
128
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What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the
wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as
described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules
and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General
Assembly resolutions?127

See Wall opinion, supra note 17.
Id. ¶ 141.
Id. ¶ 122.
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Id. ¶ 116.
Id. ¶ 138.
131
Id. ¶139.
132
Sean Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the
ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 63 (2005).
133
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the West Bank, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 141 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans) [hereinafter Wall separate opinion
of Judge Kooijmans].
134
Richard Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel’s Security Wall, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 42, 51 (2005).
135
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) [hereinafter S.C. Resolution 1368].
136
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter S.C. Resolution 1373].
137
Murphy, supra note 132, at 63.
130
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from the West Bank.129 It relied on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
affirms States’ inherent right to defend themselves from armed attacks.130
The ICJ, however, found that Article 51 had “no relevance in this case”
because the attacks are not “imputable to a foreign State,”131 suggesting that
Article 51 self-defense can only be invoked against an attack by a State.
The Court has been criticized for failing to explain how it arrived at
this conclusion given that the language of Article 51 itself has no
requirements relating to the legal personality of the attacker.132 An
explanation is unnecessary because the Court’s interpretation of Article 51
is not novel but has been the generally accepted interpretation for over fifty
years.133 Indeed, before the attacks on the World Trade Center, one would
not have imagined that non-state actors could be capable of employing the
kind of force that has traditionally only been within the purview of States.
However, global reality today is different and it is long recognized that
“any interpretation of the U.N. Charter should allow for the evolution of the
Organization [the U.N.] in accord with a changing global setting, especially
in the area of international peace and security.”134 Today’s international
community does not hesitate to acknowledge the right of States to defend
themselves against armed attacks from non-state actors. The day after the
terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the failed attack on the
Pentagon, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368,
which reaffirmed in the context of the attacks “the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter.”135
The same month, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution
1373, which also reaffirmed the inherent right to self-defense in the context
of acts of terrorism.136 This resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter and is binding upon all U.N. member States. Therefore, at
least since 2001, “state practice appears to support the permissibility of
responding in self-defense to an attack by a non-state actor.”137
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Contrary to several critics of the ICJ’s Wall opinion, despite adopting a
traditional interpretation of Article 51, the Court did not dismiss the right of
a State to defend itself against armed attacks by non-state actors.138 In fact,
the Court explicitly considered Israel’s self-defense argument under U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373.139 However, it rejected this
argument because the attacks at issue emanated from within, not outside,
territory that Israel controls.140 Several critics are baffled by the Court’s
distinction,141 but a closer reading of the Court’s opinion and Judge
Kooijmans’ separate opinion142 reveals that the distinction is well-founded.
The language of Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, on which
Israel relied, refers to “international terrorism” which affects “international
peace and security.”143 Insofar as terror attacks emanate from within
territory occupied and controlled by Israel, “[t]he situation is . . . different
from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions.”144 Consequently,
the Court found that Israel could not invoke self-defense under these
resolutions either.
There is yet another reason, not discussed by the Court in its opinion,
for why Article 51 self-defense is inapplicable to Israel. In its oral statement
to the ICJ, Palestine argued that invoking self-defense as justification for
construction of the Wall causes “an impermissible confusion” between the
jus in bello and the jus ad bellum, that “have to be kept radically apart.”145
Palestine elaborated this point in its written statement:
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138
See, e.g., id.; Emanuel Gross, Combating Terrorism: Does Self-Defense Include the Security
Barrier? The Answer Depends on Who You Ask, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569 (2005); Ruth Wedgewood,
The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L
L. 52 (2005).
139
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 138–39.
140
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶139.
141
See, e.g., Wedgewood, supra note 138; Murphy, supra note 132.
142
Wall separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, supra note 133, ¶ 36.
143
S.C. Resolution 1373, supra note 136.
144
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 139; Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me “In
Defense of the International Court”, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 82 (2005).
145
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
2004 I.C.J. Pleadings 1, at 44–45 (Feb. 23, 2004).
146
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
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The Fourth Geneva Convention permits forcible measures against
civilian populations, subject to strict limits. That exhausts the legal
rights of an Occupying Power. A State may not use all of its powers
under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Laws of War and then
decide that those powers are inadequate and invoke the more general
right of self-defense, which belongs to the jus ad bellum, in order to
avoid the constraints of international humanitarian law.146
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Self-defense is a part of the jus ad bellum, which allows for wider scope of
action than military necessity under jus in bello.147 By relying on jus ad
bellum self-defense instead of military necessity in jus in bello,148 Israel is
trying to “set aside IHL obligations” and “take a wider military action.”149
Once an armed conflict has begun, the time to invoke self-defense has
passed as the State has already resorted to force.150 Invoking self-defense as
justification for Israeli measures against terror attacks is a misuse of the two
abovementioned legal regimes.
The law of self-defense is inapplicable to the Israel-Palestine conflict
because Article 51 traditionally does not encompass armed attacks by nonstate actors. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 only refer to
international terrorism, and the self-defense argument causes an
impermissible confusion between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. The
law of self-defense, therefore, cannot be relied upon to answer the question
that is at issue in this comment.
On an important side note, just because Israel cannot rely on Article 51
self-defense does not mean that it cannot take defensive measures at all.
Emanuel Gross frustratingly writes, “[T]he central question—which the ICJ
failed to recognize—was whether Israel had the right to defend itself
against terrorist attacks.”151 What Gross fails to realize is that the Court
unequivocally acknowledged that Israel “has the right, and indeed the duty,
to respond [to terror attacks] in order to protect the life of its citizens.”152
The Court merely found that such a right cannot be based on Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter.
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Written Statement Submitted by Palestine, ¶ 534 (Jan. 29, 2004), www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/
1555.pdf.
147
OKIMOTO, supra note 89, at 34.
148
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 95 (finding that the Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies
to armed conflicts, applies to the Occupied Palestinian Territory).
149
Id.; see Scobbie, supra note 144, at 84.
150
Scobbie, supra note 144, at 84.
151
Gross, supra note 138, at 574.
152
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 141.
153
Scobbie, supra note 144, at 84.
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The right to take defensive measures in response to threats does not
entail that these must qualify or should be justified as measures taken
in self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. To equate the two is
simply to confuse the legal with the linguistic denotation of the term
“defense.” Just as “negligence,” in law, does not mean “carelessness”
but, rather, refers to an elaborate doctrinal structure, so “self-defense”
refers to a complex doctrine that has a much more restricted scope than
ordinary notions of “defense.”153
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Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25.
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 142–43.
156
Id. ¶ 195.
157
Scobbie, supra note 144, at 78.
158
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 139.
159
Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord
Palestine “Non-Member Observer State” Status in United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov.
29, 2012).
160
Id.
161
Ken Klippenstein, An Interview with Richard Falk on the Crisis in Gaza, COUNTER PUNCH
(Aug. 13, 2014), www.counterpunch.org/2014/08/13/an-interview-with-richard-falk-on-the-crisis-ingaza; see Palestinians Sign Up to Join International Criminal Court, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2014),
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30645462 (writing that the PA signed on to twenty international
treaties).
162
Klippenstein, supra note 161.
163
Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
155
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Instead of Article 51, Israel can potentially rely on the doctrine of
necessity,154 discussed in the next section, which is recognized by
international customary law.155 In fact, the ICJ considered the construction
of the wall under the doctrine of necessity, but found the doctrine could not
be availed because the chosen route of the wall—running deep into the
West Bank, thereby significantly impairing Palestinians’ movement and
resulting in the destruction of their property—was not the only means that
Israel had to protect its interests.156 In any case, the right to take defensive
measures is not legally equivalent to the right of self-defense under Article
51.157 Just because Israel does not have a right under Article 51 does not
mean it has no right to protect its civilians under other legal doctrines.
Since the Court’s opinion in 2004, Palestine has gained non-member
observer State status at the U.N. General Assembly, which could have
consequences for the applicability of Article 51 self-defense. The ICJ
interpreted Article 51 to apply only to armed attacks from one State against
another.158 In 2004, when the ICJ issued its Wall advisory opinion, Palestine
was arguably not a “State.” Its status at the U.N. General Assembly was
only that of an “observer entity,” which was first accorded to it in 1974.159
In 2012, by a vote of 138 in favor and 9 against, the U.N. General
Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status to that of non-member
observer State.160 Since its status upgrade, Palestine has signed onto at least
fifteen international treaties, which are available only to States.161 Even
before the status upgrade, however, Palestine was recognized as a State by
130 governments and had joined the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a member State.162 With its new
status, Palestine was also able to accede to the Rome Statute, granting the
International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction to investigate crimes
committed on Occupied Palestinian Territory.163 Before Palestine’s status
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Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine, I.C.C. Press Release
ICC-OTP-20150116-PR1083 (Jan. 16, 2015).
164
Situation in Palestine, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, at 2 (Apr. 3, 2012), www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/9B651B80-EC43-4945-BF5A-FAFF5F334B92/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.
pdf.
165
ICC to Probe Possible War Crimes in Palestine, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 17, 2015, 11:30 AM),
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/icc-probe-possible-war-crimes-palestine-2015116151720
780168.html.
166
Palestinian Authority Becomes Official Member of the International Criminal Court,
HAARETZ (Apr. 1, 2015, 10:36 AM), www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.650013?utm_
source=Facebook&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social.
167
Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia Article 53(1) Report,
Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, ¶ 16 (Nov. 6, 2014), www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-COM-Article_
53%281%29-Report-06Nov2014Eng.pdf.
168
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 139 (emphasis added).
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upgrade, the ICC refused to open an investigation because Palestine was not
a “State” within the meaning of the Rome Statute and, therefore, the ICC
lacked jurisdiction.164 After Palestine’s status upgrade, however, the ICC
has opened a preliminary investigation into crimes committed on
Palestinian territory.165 It also accepted Palestine as a member State party to
the Rome Statute.166
With its status upgrade, Palestine is most likely a State for purposes of
Article 51. If Article 51 self-defense applies, then it follows that as long as
Israel’s use of force was in line with the principles of necessity and
proportionality in jus ad bellum as well as the rules of warfare in jus in
bello or IHL, then force was probably legitimate and not for the illegitimate
purpose of suppressing self-determination.
Despite Palestine’s status upgrade, however, Article 51 likely still does
not apply because the terror attacks at issue are not attributable to the State
of Palestine. They are terror attacks launched by Hamas and some Bedouin
groups in the Gaza Strip while the recognized authority of the territory is
the Palestinian Authority led by President Mahmoud Abbas. The attacks,
therefore, do not constitute an armed attack by one State against another.
The ICC also stated, in an Article 53(1) Report issued after Palestine’s
status upgrade, that the Israel-Hamas conflict “do[es] not meet the basic
definition of an international armed conflict as a conflict between two or
more states.”167
Furthermore, the language of the ICJ Wall opinion suggests that the
Court found Article 51 irrelevant not because the Court did not find
Palestine to be a State but rather because “Israel does not claim that the
attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State.”168 Regardless of
Palestine’s objective legal status, it seems Israel cannot avail itself of the
self-defense argument while simultaneously denying Palestine’s status as a
State.
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Since the ICJ’s Wall opinion in 2004, Israel has disengaged from the
Gaza Strip, which could affect the applicability of Security Council
Resolutions 1368 and 1373. The Court rejected the self-defense argument
under Resolutions 1368 and 1373 because the West Bank is under Israeli
control; so, in the case of Operation Protective Edge, the question is
whether Gaza is still under the control of Israel. Gaza’s status as occupied
territory since Israel’s disengagement169 has been the subject of much
debate. If Gaza is still considered to be under Israeli control, then
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 are inapplicable, but if it is not, then Israel may
have a valid self-defense justification for Operation Protective Edge. Once
again, if the self-defense argument applies, then it follows that force was
probably legitimate as long as it met the principles of necessity and
proportionality in jus ad bellum as well as the rules of war in jus in bello or
IHL.
Gaza’s legal status has been under dispute since Israel withdrew its
military from Gaza and dismantled settlements in the strip in 2005.170 Yuval
Shany conducts a comparative analysis of the degree of effective control
exercised by Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) and finds that the PA
has greater powers of government than Israel.171 Therefore, he concludes
that Israel can no longer be regarded as the occupying power in Gaza.172
Other scholars have argued under other theories and rationale for why Israel
no longer occupies the Gaza strip. On the other hand, many in the
international community, including the ICC, are of the opinion that Israel
continues to occupy Gaza
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169
See generally Israel’s Disengagement Plan: Renewing the Peace Process, ISRAEL MINISTRY
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 20, 2005), www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israels%
20disengagement%20plan-%20renewing%20the%20peace%20process%20apr%202005.aspx.
170
See id.
171
Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza After Israel’s Disengagement, 8
Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 369 (2006); see also Avinoam Sharom, Why Is Israel’s Presence in
the Territories Still Called “Occupation”?, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (2009), http://jcpa.org/
text/Occupation-Sharon.pdf (concluding that occupation law does not apply to Gaza); Elizabeth Samson,
Is Gaza Occupied? Redefining the Status of Gaza Under International Law, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
915 (2010).
172
Shany, supra note 171.
OF
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based on the scope and degree of control that Israel has retained over
the territory of Gaza following the 2005 disengagement – including,
inter alia, Israel’s exercise of control over border crossings, the
territorial sea adjacent to the Gaza Strip, and the airspace of Gaza; its
periodic military incursions within Gaza; its enforcement of no-go
areas within Gaza near the border where Israeli settlements used to be;
and its regulation of the local monetary market based on the Israeli
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173
Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia Article 53(1) Report,
supra note 165, ¶ 27; see also Duggard, supra note 12; Lisa Hajjar, Is Gaza Still Occupied and Why
Does It Matter?, JADALIYYA (July 14, 2014), www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8807/is-gaza-stilloccupied-and-why-does-it-matter; Israel: Disengagement Will Not End Gaza Occupation, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 29, 2004), www.hrw.org/news/2004/10/28/israel-disengagement-will-not-endgaza-occupation; The Gaza Strip: Israel’s Obligations Under International Law, B’TSELEM (Jan. 1,
2015), www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/israels_obligations.
174
Valentina Azarov, Disingenuous “Disengagement”: Israel’s Occupation of the Gaza Strip
and the Protective Function of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 24, 2012), http://
opiniojuris.org/2012/04/24/disingenuous-disengagement-israels-occupation-of-the-gaza-strip-and-the-pr
otective-function-of-the-law-of-belligerent-occupation (“[T]he vigorous academic debate concerning the
current status of the Gaza Strip has arrived at an overwhelming consensus over the fact that the Gaza
Strip remains occupied territory.”)
175
Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia Article 53(1) Report,
supra note 165, ¶ 16 (emphasis added).
176
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 139.
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It is beyond the scope of this Comment to fully analyze the debates on
Gaza’s legal status, especially when the “overwhelming consensus”174 and
“prevalent view within the international community is that Israel remains an
occupying power under international law.”175 This Comment will proceed
while assuming this prevalent view.
Because Israel continues to occupy Gaza, “[t]he situation is . . .
different from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions [1368 and
1373].”176 The Resolutions refer to the inherent right of self-defense in the
context of “international terrorism” but insofar as attacks emanate from
territory which Israel controls, they do not constitute international terrorism.
Thus, because Israel continues to control Gaza, attacks launched from Gaza
do not constitute international terrorism. Therefore, just how Resolutions
1368 and 1373 did not apply to terror attacks emanating from the West
Bank, so they do not apply to attacks that are launched from Gaza.
After extending the ICJ’s analysis in the Wall opinion to Gaza, it
seems that Article 51 self-defense is not applicable to the Gaza Strip either.
Even though Palestine has now gained State status, attacks launched by
Hamas do not constitute an armed attack from a State since the international
community does not recognize Hamas as the legitimate authority of
Palestine. Even if the international community did, still Israel does not
recognize Palestine to be a State while the language of the Court’s Wall
opinion suggests that such recognition is a prerequisite to invoking Article
51 self-defense. Nor do Security Council Resolutions 1368 or 1373 seem to
apply since they refer to international terrorism while terror attacks
launched from Gaza emanate from within territory that Israel continues to
control.
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SECTION IV: THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY

177

C M
Y K

04/28/2016 10:11:02

Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25.
Id.
179
Contra Sarah Heathcote, Is State of Necessity a Principle of Customary International Law? 1
REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT’L 53 (2007) (writing that State practice does not support the assertion,
prevalent in judicial decisions, that the doctrine of necessity is customary international law).
180
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1977 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
181
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, at art. 25.
182
Id. at art. 25(2)(a)–(b).
183
Ian Johnston, The Plea of “Necessity” in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian
Intervention and Counter-Terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 340 (2004–05).
184
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 180.
185
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 140–43.
186
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25 cmt. (5).
178
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If not jus in bello, the law of occupation, or the law of self-defense,
then perhaps the doctrine of necessity can help shed some light on the
question of whether an occupying power used force to protect its civilians
or to suppress self-determination. The doctrine of necessity is also known
as “state of necessity,” “essential interests doctrine,” and the “plea of
necessity.”
The doctrine of necessity precludes the wrongfulness of a State’s act
that is not in conformity with international obligations.177 A State may
invoke the doctrine of necessity if the only way that a State can protect an
“essential interest” against a “grave an imminent peril” is by not fulfilling
an international obligation of relatively less significance.178 The doctrine of
necessity is codified in the Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, which was adopted by the International Law
Commission in 2001. It is also recognized as customary international law179
as confirmed by the ICJ for the first time in its Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project decision.180 The doctrine can only be invoked under strict
conditions defined in Article 25 of the Articles.181 Furthermore, it cannot be
invoked if “the international obligation in question excludes the possibility
of invoking necessity” or “the State has contributed to the situation of
necessity.”182
While the plea of necessity was historically only related to the concept
of self-preservation and other essential State interests, today it also
encompasses human security interests.183 Necessity has been invoked to
safeguard essential interests such as protecting the environment184 and
ensuring the safety of civilians.185
An early successful case of necessity was the Caroline incident, which
is usually wrongly referred to as a case of self-defense.186 In that case in
1837, British forces destroyed a United States vessel carrying recruits and
arms to Canadian insurgents who wanted to rebel against the British Crown.
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LORD MCNAIR, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 228 (1956).
BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1841–1842 vol. 30 at 194 (1857), http://hdl.handle.net/
2027/mdp.35112103940203.
189
Id. at 196.
190
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25 cmt.(2).
191
Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 140–43.
192
Id. at 142.
193
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25.
194
Sarah Heathcote, Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: Necessity, in THE LAW OF INT’L
RESPONSIBILITY 491, 500 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
195
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 26.
196
Id. at art. 26 cmt. (5).
188
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The British justified the destruction of the vessel by referring to the
“necessity of self-defence and self-preservation.”187 United States Secretary
of State Webster stated in his message to Congress, “This government can
never concede to any foreign Government the power, except in a case of the
most urgent and extreme necessity, of invading its territory.”188 The
incident was finally settled in 1842 when the British and American
governments agreed that “a strong overpowering necessity may arise when
this great principle may and must be suspended.”189
In order to safeguard against abuse, the plea is only accepted on an
exceptional basis.190 The ICJ in the Wall opinion, for example, considered
whether Israel could rely on the doctrine of necessity for its construction of
the wall in the West Bank.191 The essential interest that Israel was
safeguarding was the safety of its civilians. However, the ICJ found that the
facts of the case did not meet the strict conditions under which necessity
can be invoked.192 One of those conditions is that the wrongful act be “the
only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest.”193 The particular
route of the wall, the ICJ found, was not the only means at Israel’s disposal
to safeguard its interest. Israel could have, for example, built the wall on its
side of the Green Line instead of miles into the West Bank.
It is important to note that the ICJ did not address the fact that Israel
could never successfully invoke the plea of necessity in the Wall case since
its construction violated the preemptory norm of self-determination.194
Article 26 of the Articles excludes the possibility of invoking the plea of
necessity if the wrongful act “is not in conformity with an obligation arising
under a preemptory norm of general international law.”195 The
commentaries to the Articles explicitly list respecting the right to selfdetermination as an example of a preemptory norm from which no
derogation is possible even under the doctrine of necessity.196 The ICJ
found that the wall “severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people
of its right to self-determination and is therefore a breach of Israel’s
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SECTION V: INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO-FACTOR TEST
Neither jus in bello, occupation law, the law of self-defense, nor the
doctrine of necessity offer appropriate guidance to determine whether force
used by an occupying power was to protect its civilians or to suppress a
people’s right to self-determination. Jus in bello is inapplicable to the
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obligation to respect that right.”197 Given that the Court had already
concluded that the wall violated the right to self-determination—a
preemptory norm—it was unnecessary for it to even conduct the plea of
necessity analysis. The plea is unavailable if the wrongful act violates a
preemptory norm.
Nevertheless, even though the plea of necessity was unsuccessful in
the particular instance of the wall in the West Bank, the Wall opinion
shows that Israel can in principle rely on necessity to use force against
terror attacks emanating from the Occupied Palestinian Territory. That is as
long as it does not violate the obligation to respect the Palestinians’ right to
self-determination in the process. In effect this means that the doctrine of
necessity does not help answer the question whether force was used to
protect civilians or to suppress self-determination. This is because necessity
precluding the wrongfulness of an act presumes a wrong act, which brings
us back to the question whether force was in fact wrong (i.e., for the
purpose of suppressing self-determination).
In the Wall opinion, for example, the construction of the wall was
wrong because it violated several provisions of the Fourth Geneva
Convention and the Hague Regulations, including the destruction of private
property of the occupied inhabitants, as well as several provisions of the
International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights.198 The doctrine of
necessity was considered by the ICJ only after the wrongfulness of the wall
was established.199 But how is one to know whether force in Operation
Protective Edge was wrongfully used to suppress the Gazans’ struggle for
self-determination? This is the very question that this Comment seeks to
answer. Even determining whether the plea of necessity is excluded under
Article 26 requires a preliminary determination of whether force violated
the preemptory norm of the right to self-determination. Applying the
doctrine of necessity itself necessitates answering the question at issue in
this Comment. It, therefore, does not help to determine whether force by an
occupying power was used to protect civilians or to suppress selfdetermination.

Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 122.
Id. ¶¶ 132–34.
Id. ¶ 140.
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Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 121.
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question at hand since it merely governs how armed hostilities are
conducted once they have begun, and is unconcerned with the motives
behind the use of force. Furthermore, occupation law in general is inapt to
deal with the question since it developed outside the context of colonial
occupation and, therefore, does not account for self-determination. The law
of self-defense, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter specifically, is inapplicable
against attacks launched by Hamas since it is not a State actor and Article
51 is traditionally interpreted as applying only to force used by one State
against another. Nor is the new conceptualization of self-defense under
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which extends to
international terrorism from non-State actors, relevant because the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (including Gaza) is within the control of
Israel. Attacks emanating from within the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
therefore, do not constitute “international terrorism” under the
Resolutions.200 As for the doctrine of necessity, it presumes a wrong act,
which brings us back to the question of whether force was indeed wrong
(i.e., was it used to suppress self-determination?). None of these legal
regimes or doctrines directly or even indirectly answers the question at
issue in this Comment. Neither forms an appropriate legal basis for
determining the issue at hand.
It follows, therefore, that tackling the question would require a factual
determination on a case-by-case basis. The ICJ in the Wall case, for
example, found that the wall in the West Bank violated the Palestinians’
right to self-determination because it created a “fait acompli,” which would
eventually become permanent and be “tantamount to de facto
annexation.”201 It determined so after carefully considering all facts and
arguments both defending the wall (including the argument that the wall is
a temporary structure to be dismantled upon a final resolution to the
conflict) and opposing it.202 The Court did not refer to any law or legal test
as the basis for its determination, which we now know is because such a
legal basis does not exist. A similar factual determination is required to
determine whether force used in Operation Protective Edge was for the
legitimate purpose of protecting civilians or for suppressing the struggle for
self-determination.
This Comment proposes a two-factor test to help with the factual
determination. The test involves the following two factors: (1) was force
necessary to combat the threat to Israel’s inhabitants; and (2) did force go
beyond that which was necessary to combat the threat? “Necessary” under
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the first factor means that no viable non-forceful alternatives were
available. If force was not necessary to protect inhabitants because other
means of protection were available and feasible, then this is an indication
that force was for the illegitimate purpose of suppressing selfdetermination. The condition that alternative means be feasible anticipates
situations when other means may be available but not feasible for reasons
such as temporal constraints. A threat may be imminent while non-forceful
means may take time to implement.
When it comes to the second factor, if an occupying power is indeed
protecting its inhabitants, it would use only so much force as is necessary to
combat the threat and no more. The concept is similar to Daniel Webster’s
statement during the Caroline affair, “the act justified by the necessity . . .
must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.”203 If force goes
beyond that which was necessary to protect inhabitants, then the excess is
likely for the illegitimate purpose of suppressing self-determination.
The two-factor test should not be confused with either the doctrine of
necessity precluding the wrongfulness of an act or jus ad bellum necessity.
While the two-factor test is similar to some of the conditions of the doctrine
of necessity, the legal status and the purpose of the two are completely
different. While the doctrine of necessity is customary international law that
precludes the wrongfulness of an act, the two-factor test is simply a nonexhaustive list of factors that a fact-finder may employ to determine the
purpose of the use of force by an occupying power. Sequentially, the twofactor test comes earlier in the analysis than the doctrine of necessity.
Nor should the two-factor test be confused with jus ad bellum
necessity. While the two seem extremely similar in their content, they are
wholly different in their legal status and purpose. The factors are just that—
factors. They simply help make a factual determination regarding the
purpose behind the use of force by an occupying power. Unlike jus ad
bellum necessity, the factors do not form a legal basis for the use of force.
This Comment has already established that Israel cannot rely on any legal
basis, except the doctrine of necessity, to use force against attacks launched
by Hamas in Gaza. The factors simply help determine whether the force
used by Israel was indeed for the purpose of protecting its inhabitants or
whether its aim was to suppress the Gazans’ right to self-determination.
The second factor should not be confused with jus in bello
proportionality as the two seem very similar. Jus in bello proportionality is
concerned with whether the harm to civilian life and property was
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proportional to the direct and concrete military advantage sought.204 Jus in
bello proportionality, in other words, tries to weigh the cost to civilian life
and property against the military gain achieved. The second of the two
factors proposed in this Comment, however, does not consider the harm to
civilian life or property at all. Nor does it involve a weighing of the harm
against the military advantage gained. Rather, the second factor is only
concerned with whether the force used, regardless of whether or not it was
proportional to the military advantage sought, went beyond that which was
necessary to combat the threat at hand. The harm from the use of force
could be wholly disproportional to the military advantage sought and yet be
within the limits of that which is necessary to combat the threat at hand.
The two factors are simply considerations that a fact-finder should take
into account when making a factual determination on the purpose behind
the use of force by an occupying power. They help ground the analysis and
provide some level of uniformity in analyses from case to case. The factors
neither are conclusive in and of themselves nor do they constitute an
exhaustive list of factors to consider when making a factual determination.
Rather, they should be used alongside other relevant considerations, if any,
and should be viewed within the larger context of the occupation at issue.
SECTION VI: APPLYING THE TWO-FACTOR TEST TO
OPERATION PROTECTIVE EDGE—GAZA’S TUNNELS
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204
Adil Ahmad Haque, A Theory of Jus in Bello Proportionality, in WEIGHING LIVES:
COMBATANTS & CIVILIANS IN WAR (Jens Ohlin et al. eds., forthcoming 2016), www.academia.edu/
11341774/A_Theory_of_Jus_in_Bello_Proportionality.
205
The IDF’s Mission in Gaza: Destroy Hamas Terror Tunnels, IDF BLOG (July 17, 2014),
www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/17/idf-begins-ground-operation-gaza.
206
Inside the Tunnels Hamas Built: Israel’s Struggle Against New Tactic in Gaza War, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014, 10:16 AM), www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/02/tunnels-hamas-israelstruggle-gaza-war.
207
Aaron Klein & Mitch Ginsburg, Could Israeli Soldiers, Not Civilians, Be the Target of the
Attack Tunnels?, TIMES OF ISRAEL (July 29, 2014, 1:03 PM), www.timesofisrael.com/soldiers-notcivilians-are-tunnel-infiltration-goals-says-senior-intelligence-source; Emanual Yalin, Were Gaza
Tunnels Built to Harm Israeli Civilians?, 972 MAG (Aug. 11, 2014), http://972mag.com/were-gazatunnels-built-to-harm-israeli-civilians/95279.
208
Klein & Ginsburg, supra note 207; Yalin, supra note 207 (citing leader of Hamas’ Qassam
Brigade’s interest in targeting Israeli soldiers over civilians).
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One of the officially stated purposes of Operation Protective Edge was
to destroy the “terror tunnels.”205 These tunnels, built by Hamas, reach up to
thirty meters below the ground.206 They run across the border from Gaza
into Israeli territory. According to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, the
Israeli army, and other Israeli officials, the “sole purpose” of the tunnels
was to kill Israeli civilians,207 although it is more likely that the target of the
tunnels were Israeli soldiers.208 It was through a tunnel that Hamas had
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kidnapped Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in 2006, who was later released in
2011 in a prisoner swap deal.209 All tunnels leading into Israel opened
within a few hundred meters of the Israel-Gaza border, and none opened
into civilian communities.210
While Israel had known about the existence of the tunnels “for some
time,” it was not aware of just how vast and effective the tunnel system
was.211 This discovery was made after Israel had already launched
Operation Protective Edge. Upon discovery of the tunnels, according to
some Israeli officials, the objective of the operation shifted from stopping
Hamas rocket fire to destroying the tunnels.212 According to the Israeli
military, there were forty such tunnels of which fourteen connected to
Israel.213
Applying the first factor of the two-factor test, it is clear that the use of
force was not necessary to combat the threat posed by the tunnels because
of the availability of viable non-forceful alternatives. While there were
fourteen tunnels that connected to Israel, there were around 1,400 that lead
to Egypt.214 The tunnels to Egypt were used to smuggle in goods after Israel
imposed a siege on Gaza, which crippled its economy and led to the
development of an active underground trade.215 The tunnel trade with Egypt
was essential for Gaza’s economy following the imposition of the siege in
2007. In one incident, militants also used the tunnels to cross into Egypt
where they gunned down sixteen Egyptian border guards.216 General Sisi of
Egypt neutralized the threat of the tunnels by simply sealing them off at the
Egyptian side of the border.217 In some cases, Egypt flooded the tunnels.218
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Egypt did not have to go into Gaza and use devastating force in order to
deal with the tunnel threat.
In fact, non-forceful measures were available to Israel for years before
Operation Protective Edge. The Israeli Defense Ministry was considering
digging a moat around Gaza to stop the tunnels as far back as the year
2000.219 It had spent several years and a significant amount of money on the
idea.220 It was not as if using force was the better or more effective option.
In fact, because the tunnels were deep below the ground, they were not
vulnerable to bombs or artillery shells.221
Applying the second factor of the two-factor test, the force used by
Israel went beyond that which was necessary to combat the threat posed by
the tunnels, indicating a motive other than the neutralization of a threat to
its inhabitants. For example, Israel struck United Nations Relief Works
Agency (UNRWA) schools sheltering displaced Palestinians multiple times
despite the fact that the UNRWA had informed the Israeli military of the
schools’ coordinates multiple times.222 Striking the schools, which resulted
in the deaths of forty-seven civilians,223 was completely unnecessary to
combat the threat posed by the tunnels. It was also unnecessary to stop
rocket attacks, the second stated purpose of Operation Protective Edge,
since the schools were not housing Hamas members or rockets. While the
UNRWA found Hamas rockets stored in some of the agency’s schools,
these were not the schools that Israel targeted.224 Following Operation
Protective Edge, Amnesty International published a report, which revealed
“a pattern of frequent Israeli attacks using large aerial bombs to level
civilian homes, sometimes killing entire families.”225 Amnesty International
found that some of the attacks served no military purpose.226 The lack of
military purpose for the strikes on homes goes beyond that which was
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necessary to combat the threat of the tunnels (or even the threat posed by
Hamas rockets). This indicates a motive other than the protection of Israeli
lives.
Furthermore, at least 120 Palestinians were killed during the Shujaiyah
assault.227 Israeli soldiers allegedly drew an imaginary, arbitrary red line
and shot anyone who crossed it, whether civilian or combatant.228 Four of
Mohammed Fathi Al Areer’s brothers, including his mentally disabled
sibling, were shot in cold blood.229 Israeli soldiers also shot dead four
unarmed members of the Shamaly family after breaking into their home.230
A fifth member of the Shamaly family was shot while he was searching
among the rubble for his family members during a temporary ceasefire.231
The indiscriminate force used in Shujaiyah went well beyond that which
was necessary to combat the threat of either the tunnels or Hamas rockets.
The intentional targeting of civilians without military purpose achieves
nothing towards the end of destroying the tunnels or killing Hamas
members in order to protect Israeli inhabitants. The excessive use of force
without military purpose indicates a motive other than the protection of
Israeli lives.
Therefore, the use of force was not necessary to combat the threat
posed by the tunnels as Israel could have simply sealed them off or flooded
them like Egypt did. Additionally, in several instances, the force Israel used
went far beyond that which was necessary to destroy the tunnels (or even to
stop the rocket attacks), indicating that the motive behind the use of force
was something other than the protection of Israeli lives.
Other considerations that support this finding are certain statements
made by Israeli officials and certain official Israeli policies. Israeli officials
have themselves stated their intentions to suppress the Gazans’ struggle for
self-determination or destroy their national liberation movement. It is
openly admitted by Israeli officials, including those in the Defense
Ministry, that the aim of Israel’s policy towards Gaza is to make life so
miserable for Gazans that it forces them to turn against the government of
Hamas.232 Following Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, Israeli Prime

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 147 Side A

04/28/2016 10:11:02

14 - RAIS_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Analysis of Operation Protective Edge

4/15/16 8:21 PM

287

Minister Netanyahu stated that the operation should have lasted longer so
the IDF could have toppled Hamas.233 Toppling or weakening the resistance
capacity of an elected government (and also a liberation group) is probably
the clearest violation of the obligation to respect the right to selfdetermination. Most recently, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said in an
interview in March of 2015 that as long as he is in power, he will not allow
the creation of a Palestinian State.234 Meanwhile, in 2001, a camera caught
Netanyahu describing how he manipulated the peace process in a way that
would have left the Oslo Accords null and void.235
When considering the above in light of the fact that the occupation has
been running for forty-eight years, it becomes even more likely that the aim
of Operation Protective Edge was not simply to protect Israelis, but rather
to stop Palestinian resistance all together. The head of the IDF’s Planning
Division stated that the aim of Operation Protective Edge was to return to
the status quo, which he described as a “calm in the south.”236 But to return
to a “calm” effectively means to return to a situation of no resistance while
the siege and control of Gaza’s borders, waters, and airspace continues.
Insofar as the aim was for the Palestinians to give up any and all resistance
and acquiesce to their condition, it is a violation of the obligation to respect
their right to self-determination. Echoing John Duggard’s conclusion, the
purpose of Israel’s use of force, in light of the two-factor test and
surrounding circumstances, seems to be defending its occupation rather
than defending its people.
SECTION VII: CONCLUSION
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As the law currently stands, no legal basis exists to ground an answer
to the question of whether force used by an occupying power was for the
purpose of protecting its inhabitants or for suppressing a people’s struggle
for self-determination. Although the ICJ concluded in the Wall opinion that
IHL applies to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the jus in bello legal
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regime is irrelevant to the question posed in this Comment. Jus in bello
only deals with how warfare is conducted once an armed struggle begins
and is not concerned with the motives behind the use of force. Nor is the
law of occupation, in general, relevant to this question because the law of
occupation was developed outside the context of colonial occupations and,
thus, does not take into account issues of self-determination. The law of
self-defense is an inappropriate legal basis to ground an analysis since
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter self-defense traditionally only applies to an
armed attack by one State against another. Israel does not recognize
Palestine as a State, and even if it did, the attacks were launched by Hamas,
which is a non-State actor. Nor does the new conceptualization of selfdefense under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which
encompasses armed attacks by non-State actors, apply since the relevant
attacks emanate from territory within the control of Israel. Therefore, they
do not constitute the type of “international terrorism” to which the
Resolutions refer. Lastly, while the doctrine of necessity can apply to
Israel’s use of force, it does not form an appropriate legal basis to ground
analysis of the issue at play in this Comment either. The doctrine of
necessity presumes a wrong act, which brings us back to the question of
whether force used by an occupying power was indeed wrong (i.e., whether
it was used to suppress the right to self-determination).
Absent an appropriate legal basis, answering the question requires a
case-by-case factual determination. The purpose of the two-factor test,
proposed in this Comment, is to assist with that factual determination and
provide some level of uniformity in analyses from case to case. Application
of the two-factor test to the issue of tunnels leading from Gaza to Israel
shows that Israel likely used force during Operation Protective Edge to
suppress Palestinian resistance rather than to protect its inhabitants. Using
bombs and artillery shells to destroy the tunnels, resulting in a large number
of casualties, was not the only viable means with which Israel could combat
the threat of the tunnels. Israel could have simply sealed the tunnels at its
end or flooded them like Egypt did. Additionally, the force used was
excessive and went beyond that which was necessary to combat the threat
of tunnels (or even the threat posed by Hamas rockets). Both these factors
are indicators of an intent to suppress Palestinian resistance rather than
protect Israeli inhabitants. When considered within the larger context,
including how long the occupation has lasted, statements made by Israeli
officials, the crippling siege of Gaza, and certain official Israeli policies, it
becomes even more likely that force was part of a larger policy to suppress
Palestinian self-determination. Operation Protective Edge, it appears, was
about defending the occupation rather than defending Israelis.

